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Introduction
INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS NOW EXISTS that the world's cli-
mate is warming and that human activity is the primary source of that
change. In 2005 alone, the atmospheric concentration of carbon diox-
ide, the most prevalent greenhouse gas, greatly exceeded its natural
range over the past 650,000 years.1 The annual growth rate of carbon
dioxide has been higher over the past decade than it has been since
direct atmospheric measurements began in 1960.2 The use of fossil
fuels is generally considered the primary contributor to the world's
increase in atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide since the
pre-industrial period.3
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC"), es-
tablished by the United Nations and World Meteorological Organiza-
tion in 1988, recently issued two reports on global warming.4 The
IPCC's February 2007 report concludes, with ninety percent certainty,
that human activity has been the main contributor to climate change
since 1950.5 The IPCC's April 2007 report focuses on the discernible
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1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE ("IPCC"), Working Group I, Cli-
mate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis - Summary for Policymakers (2007) [here-
inafter IPCC THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS], available at http://ipcc-wgl.ucar.edu/wgl/
docs/WG 1AR4_SPMApproved_05Feb.pdf.
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See James Kanter & Andrew C. Revkin, Emissions Already Affecting Climate, Report
Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/06/science/earth/06
cnd-climate.html; see also IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, ADAPTA-
TION AND VULNERABILITY (2007) [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM6avr07.pdf; IPCC, The Physical Science Basis, supra note 1.
5. See IPCC, The Physical Science Basis, supra note 1.
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impacts of warming and the most effective means of mitigating such
impacts. 6 Notably, the United States reportedly contributed to the
most recent IPCC report.7 Perhaps even more significantly, at the
June 2007 Group of Eight Meeting in Germany, the current United
States administration publicly acknowledged, on record, that global
warming is a reality and that the administration would consider meet-
ing definitive goals for the significant reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions over the coming decades. 8
The United States' participation in the IPCC's reports is notable,
because the United States historically has been slow to acknowledge
the causes and effects of global warming. For example, the United
States, parting from the most developed nations, refused to ratify the
1997 Kyoto Protocol, which set mandatory greenhouse gas emission-
reduction targets for signatory industrialized nations.9 More recently,
the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") claimed
that it lacks the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions under
the Federal Clean Air Act10 ("CAA"), although a recent United States
Supreme Court decision substantially, if not completely, undermined
that position.ii While EPA also recently acknowledged that CAA
should govern the regulation of domestic greenhouse gas emissions, 1
2
the extent to which EPA will pursue meaningful regulation prior to
the next general election remains unclear. Additionally, members of
Congress have introduced a number of legislative proposals for the
regulation of greenhouse gases, but again, it remains questionable
whether Congress will enact any such proposals into law in the fore-
seeable future.i 3
6. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, supra note 4.
7. See Kanter & Revkin, supra note 4.
8. See Michael A. Fletcher, G-8 Leaders Back 'Substantial' Cuts in Gas Emissions - Bush
Prevails Against Binding Targets, WASH. POST, June 8, 2007, at A12.
9. For information on the Kyoto Protocol, see United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/items/2830.
php (last visited Aug. 14, 2007).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-767lq (2000).
11. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
12. Bush Orders First Federal Regulation of Greenhouse Gases, ENV'T NEWS SERV., May 14,
2007, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/may2007/2007-05-14-06.asp (quoting EPA Ad-
ministrator Stephen Johnson's comment on a May 14, 2007 Executive Order by President
Bush which directed EPA and the Departments of Transportation, Energy, and Agriculture
to take initial steps toward adopting regulations to control greenhouse gas emissions from
motor vehicles under the CAA and other applicable federal law).
13. Houston Chronicle Staff, Carbon Crackdown - Congress Takes Its First Halting Steps to
Confront Global Warming, Cut Emzssion of Greenhouse Gases, HOUSTON CHRON., July 18, 2007,
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2007-4386523. Among the bills re-
cendy introduced in the United States Senate to respond to global warming are Electric
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The failure of national policy makers to take action has led a
number of states and communities to address climate change on a
regional or statewide basis.1 4 For example, in 2006, the California
state legislature passed the Global Warming Solutions Act ("Act"),
making California the first state to mandate enforceable limits on
greenhouse gas emissions.1 5 The Act requires statewide greenhouse
gas emissions to be reduced to 1990 levels by the year 2020.16 Pursu-
ant to the Act, the California Air Resources Board ("CARB") is re-
quired to develop early implementation strategies for controlling
greenhouse gas emissions within several industrial sectors.1 7 In addi-
tion to these efforts in California, a number of Northeastern and Mid-
Atlantic states have become involved in a Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative ("RGGI") to develop a model rule for regulating greenhouse
gas emissions through a market-based emissions trading program de-
signed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by ten percent by 2019.18
While state and regional attempts at addressing greenhouse gas
emissions may be laudatory, such efforts do not and cannot fully re-
spond to the fundamental problem that greenhouse-gas-induced cli-
mate change is a global problem that requires global solutions. Only
the federal government has the ability to legitimately engage the inter-
Utility Cap and Trade Act, S. 317, 110th Cong. (2007) (amending the CAA to establish a
program to regulate the emission of greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities); Ten-
in-Ten Fuel Economy Act, S. 537, 110th Cong. (2007) (improving passenger automobile
fuel economy and safety and reduce greenhouse gas emissions; Clean Fuels and Vehicles
Act, S. 1073, 110th Cong. (2007) (increasing the supply of bio-diesel, E85, and other low-
carbon fuel.); see U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein, Cal., Issue Statements - Global Warming: A
Time to Act, http://feinstein.senate.gov/public/ (follow "Global Warming: A Time to Act"
hyperlink under "Priorities" heading) (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
14. See 38 Env't Rep. (BNA) 7, at 388-89, 393 (Feb. 16, 2007).
15. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-38599 (West 2006).
16. See id. § 38561 (a) ("On or before January 1, 2009, the [California Air Resources
Board] shall prepare and approve a scoping plan ... for achieving the maximum techno-
logically feasible and cost-effective reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from sources or
categories of sources of greenhouse gases by 2020 ...."); see also id. § 38550 ("By January 1,
2008, the state board shall.., determine what the statewide greenhouse gas emissions level
was in 1990, and approve ... a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit that is equivalent
to that level ....").
17. See id. § 38560.5(a) ("On or before June 30, 2007, the state board shall publish
and make available to the public a list of discrete early action greenhouse gas emission
reduction measures that can be implemented prior to the measures and limits adopted
pursuant to Section 38562.").
18. A proposed model rule was issued on August 15, 2006, and currently is being
circulated among states participating in RGGI for possible statutory and/or regulatory im-
plementation. Additional background information about RGGI, including a copy of the
proposed model rule, can be obtained from RGGI, http://www.rggi.org (last visited Sept.
6, 2007).
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national community on an issue as significant as climate change. How-
ever, because the federal government has failed to show the necessary
political force on the matter, both state governments and various non-
governmental organizations have decided to bypass the federal gov-
ernment and pursue progress on climate change, at both the national
and international level, through the judicial system.
The most visible manifestation of this strategy is the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.' 9 This case
addressed EPA's refusal to regulate tailpipe emissions from cars and
trucks under section 202 (a) (1) of CAA20 because it lacked the author-
ity to regulate tailpipe emissions. 2I A coalition of states, local govern-
ments, and private organizations challenged this claim. 22 On April 2,
2007, the Supreme Court held that EPA does possess the authority to
regulate tailpipe emissions under section 202(a) (1).23 While the Su-
preme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA is limited to the regula-
tion of motor vehicles under CAA, the decision suggests that the
federal government also has the authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from stationary sources, such as coal-fired-electrical-power
generation plants. For example, in Coke Oven Environmental Taskforce v.
EPA,2 4 ten states, two cities, and three environmental groups chal-
lenged EPA's refusal to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from power
plants under EPA regulations governing stationary sources. 25 The
D.C. Circuit stayed further proceedings in Coke Oven awaiting the Su-
preme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA. 2
6
19. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a)(1) (2000).
21. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1438.
22. See id. at 1446.
23. See id. at 1462.
24. No. 06-1131 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 7, 2006).
25. Petitioners in the Coke Oven case are challenging EPA's 2006 new source perform-
ance standards ("NSPSs") for certain utility and power plants. Petition for Review, Coke
Oven Envtl. Task Force v. EPA, No. 06-1149 (D.C. Cir. filed Apr. 7, 2006). NSPSs set limits
on emissions of certain pollutants from new (or significantly modified) stationary sources.
Prot. of Env't, 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.20 (2006). Petitioners had asked EPA to promulgate
standards for greenhouse gas emissions as part of the 2006 rulemaking, but EPA refused to
do so, prompting the litigation over the final rule. In light of the Supreme Court's decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Coke Oven petitioners moved on May 2, 2007 to proceed with
the litigation, asking the court of appeal to summarily vacate the NSPS rule and remand
the matter back to EPA for further rulemaking proceedings. Motion Governing Further
Proceedings, New York v. EPA, No. 06-1322 (D.C. Cir. filed Sept. 13, 2006).
26. Among the states' more novel attempts to address global warming through the
courts are filing of common law tort actions against corporations whose activities or prod-
ucts generate significant greenhouse gas emissions. In Connecticut v. American Electnc Power
Co., Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), eight states (along with the City of New York
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Citizens have long sought to shape national environmental policy
through litigation brought under federal environmental statutes. The
problem with cases like Massachusetts v. EPA is that the statute under
which the litigation is brought inherently constrains the scope of the
litigation. Litigation under CAA, for example, is constrained by the
limits imposed by Congress on the authority of EPA to regulate spe-
cific sources of pollutants within the scope of EPA's jurisdiction. Such
litigation cannot extend to matters outside EPA's statutory jurisdic-
tion, such as sources of greenhouse gas emissions outside the United
States, or even facilities within the United States that may not directly
emit greenhouse gas but nonetheless contribute to atmospheric con-
centrations of greenhouse gas. 27 These limitations have prompted
some litigants to look to more expansive legal frameworks to force
action on global warming.
This Article examines various attempts to address climate change
through the statutory framework established by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act 28 ("NEPA") of 1969. NEPA is the first and most
and several land trusts) sued five large electric-power producers, alleging that carbon diox-
ide emissions from the defendants' fossil-fuel-fired generation plants constituted a public
nuisance. Id. at 267. More recently, the State of California filed a nuisance action in federal
court against six large motor vehicle manufacturers, making similar claims with respect to
carbon dioxide emissions from cars and trucks. See Complaint for Damages and Declara-
tory Judgment at 4-5, Calfornza v. Gen. Motors, No. C06-05755 MJJ (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
2006), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms06/06-082 0a.pdf. The court recently
dismissed California's nuisance claim on the grounds that it "presents a non-justiciable
political question." See Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 23, California v.
Gen. Motors, No. C06-05755 MU (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007), avadable at http://www.cand.us
courts.gov/cand/udges.nsf/59881109elfdb45688256d480060b737/61 c396eab912118688
25735900798cf7/$FILE/5755orderdism.pdf. The court was particularly critical of the
state's claim for monetary damages, noting that
the cases cited by Plaintiff do not provide the Court with [a] legal framework or
applicable standards upon which to allocate fault or damages, if any, in this case.
The Court is left without guidance in determining what is an unreasonable contri-
bution to the sum of carbon dioxide in the Earth's atmosphere, or in determin-
ing who should bear the costs associated with the global climate change that
admittedly result[s] from multiple sources around the globe. Plaintiff has failed
to provide convincing legal authority to support its proposition that the legal
framework for assessing global warming nuisance damages is well-established.
Id. at 21-22.
27. An example of a project that might not itself emit significant quantities of green-
house gases but indirectly could affect global warming would be installation of a pipeline
connecting elements of a larger oil-and-gas development project. Oil-and-gas pipelines
transport hydrocarbons that eventually will be burned as fuels, producing carbon dioxide
that might contribute to climate change. This is exactly the type of project addressed in the
Friends of Earth v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007), litigation, discussed
below.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
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wide-ranging of modern United States environmental laws. It not only
establishes fundamental United States policy on environmental pro-
tection, but also compels federal agencies to promote that policy
through a detailed review of the environmental impacts of their ac-
tions.29 NEPA has long been used as a tool to challenge environmen-
tally sensitive projects in the United States. As a result, a significant
body of legal precedent has evolved to guide prospective litigants
seeking to challenge new projects, both within and outside of the
United States. At the same time, some of the more recent attempts to
use NEPA as a means of responding to climate change have taken the
law beyond anything Congress likely intended when it was enacted.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of NEPA and some of
the issues raised in litigation brought under the statute to address cli-
mate change impacts. Part II reviews some of the more significant re-
cent judicial decisions30 that have attempted to grapple with these
issues, with a focus on questions of standing, causation, and the char-
acter of projects that may or may not warrant NEPA review in a cli-
mate change context. Part III concludes, in light of these decisions,
that while climate change impacts may well be a legitimate subject for
consideration under NEPA, only changes in national and interna-
tional policy are likely to have any real impact on the important prob-
lem of global warming.
I. Climate Change as an "Environmental Impact" Under
NEPA
NEPA is the cornerstone of United States environmental law and
policy. In part, NEPA requires all federal agencies to
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the humah environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed
action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to
the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term
uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhance-
ment of long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irre-
trievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the
proposed action should it be implemented.3 1
29. See id.
30. See, e.g., Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889; Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472
F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2006); Power Plant Working Group v. Dep't of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d
997 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c).
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As a general matter, evaluation of the environmental conse-
quences of a proposed federal action is accomplished through the
preparation of an environmental impact statement ("EIS"). 32 A pro-
ject proponent generally determines whether to prepare an EIS based
on the results of an initial environmental assessment ("EA") of the
project's potential environmental impacts.33 If the agency determines,
based on the EA, that an EIS is not required, it must make "a finding
of no significant impact," a conclusion that the project will not have
significant environmental impacts or that those impacts will be effec-
tively mitigated through project modifications.3 4
Unlike other federal environmental laws, NEPA does not include
a so-called "citizen suit" provision, a provision that allows private par-
ties to initiate civil actions to enjoin compliance with a particular envi-
ronmental law. 35 Instead, actions to prosecute claims for alleged
NEPA violations must be brought under the Administrative Procedure
Act ("APA") ,36 on grounds that a United States governmental agency
has failed to comply with applicable procedural requirements in un-
dertaking a particular administrative action. 37 Examples of NEPA ac-
tions challenged under APA include the issuance of a permit,
approval of a federal program, and adoption of a federal administra-
tive rule or regulation. Under APA, any person "aggrieved" by a fed-
eral agency action may bring a lawsuit to challenge the action as
procedurally deficient or otherwise inconsistent with applicable law
(including the provisions of NEPA).38 Several cases brought by citizen
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2006); see also Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Babbitt,
241 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir. 2001).
33. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c); see also Silverton Snowmobile Club v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
433 F.3d 772, 780 (10th Cir. 2006).
34. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13; see also Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 402
F.3d 846, 864 (9th Cir. 2005); Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 2003).
35. See Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Lujan v. Nat'l
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882 (1990)) ("[N]o provision of NEPA explicitly grants any
person or entity standing to enforce the statute."). An example of a citizen suit provision
that has been widely used over the years is section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (2000). Section 505 provides,
subject to certain limitations, that "any citizen may commence a civil action on his
own behalf -(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency ... ) who is alleged to be in viola-
tion of [the Act], or (2) against the Administrator [of the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency] to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not
discretionary with the Administrator."
Id.
36. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
37. See Cetacean Cmty., 386 F.3d at 1176-77.
38. 5 U.S.C. § 702(a) (2000).
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groups in the past five years have challenged particular NEPA deci-
sions based, at least in part, on the federal agency's failure to properly
consider issues related to climate change when making a decision pur-
suant to NEPA.
The cases that have addressed climate change and NEPA litiga-
tion have focused on two issues: first, whether plaintiffs have been or
will be sufficiently injured by the potential impacts of a federal action
on climate change to have standing to challenge that action in court;
and, second, whether the alleged connection between the federal ac-
tion and climate change is of the magnitude and type to warrant the
kind of environmental review required by NEPA. As discussed in
greater detail throughout the remainder of this Article, even where
these challenges failed to overturn the particular action in question,
they have proved effective in that the challenged agencies are likely to
consider global warming when making NEPA-related decisions in the
future.
II. Recent Significant NEPA Litigation
A. Border Power Plant Working Group v. DOE
Border Power Plant Working Group v. DOE (Border Power/)39 is the
first of several recent cases that have addressed climate change issues
under NEPA. In Border Power I, the first of the two Border Power deci-
sions, the court directly addressed both the issue of standing and the
connection between the challenged federal action and global warm-
ing.40 The case focused on the failure of the Department of Energy
("DOE") and the Federal Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") to
prepare an EIS for the construction of transmission lines to connect
new Mexican power plants to the California power grid. 4' DOE and
BLM both independently prepared initial EAs for the project.42 Based
on the analysis contained in the EAs, both agencies issued a "finding
of no significant impact," each of which concluded that NEPA re-
quired no further environmental review.43 The plaintiff, an organiza-
tion allegedly established for the sole purpose of challenging the
39. 260 F. Supp. 2d 997 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1006. DOE had been asked to issue "Presidential" permits to allow cross-
border construction of the power lines. BLM had been asked to issue similar permits for
necessary rights of way across lands within the United States where the lines would be
located. Id.
42. See id. at 1008.
43. Id.
[Vol. 42
project, filed an action asserting that the agencies' NEPA review was
inadequate because they failed to evaluate the impact of emissions
from the Mexican power plants that would be generating the electric-
ity transported by the transmission line project.44
The court first evaluated whether the plaintiff had standing
under NEPA and APA. 45 Neither DOE nor BLM challenged the plain-
tiff's standing to bring the action in federal court.46 However, the dis-
trict court nonetheless independently determined that an evaluation
of standing was necessary to establish jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
claims. 47
The court properly focused its standing analysis on the seminal
1992 United States Supreme Court decision, Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life.48 Lujan outlines several key criteria that plaintiffs traditionally
have had to meet in order to establish standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact." The Su-
preme Court's opinions have defined such an injury as "an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical." Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendants. Third, it must be "likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision." 49
The most important of these three criteria in procedural cases
brought under NEPA and APA is the requirement of injury in fact.
According to the Court,
The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect
his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the
normal standards for redressability and immediacy. Thus, under
our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed construc-
tion of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the li-
censing agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact
statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that
the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and
even though the dam will not be completed for many years.
50
In the past, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has emphasized
the singular importance of injury in fact in procedural cases and re-
duced the elements that must be shown to establish procedural stand-
44. See id.
45. See id. at 1008-10.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1008-11.
48. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
49. Border Power 1, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1009 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
50. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
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ing to the following: the plaintiff must show "(1) that he or she is a
'person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect [his or
her] concrete interests. . . ' and (2) that the plaintiff has 'some threat-
ened concrete interest . . .that is the ultimate basis of [his or her]
standing.' "51
Having articulated the applicable requirements for standing, the
court in Border Power I went on to find that the plaintiff, an association
comprised of various individuals living near the proposed transmis-
sion project, met those requirements. 52 Ironically, it based that deter-
mination on extra-record declarations of association members that
allegedly lived "near" the project, in either Imperial County, Califor-
nia or Mexicali, Mexico, and shared "a concern for the environmental
health of the border region."53 Beyond that, it did not discuss with any
specificity how the proposed project in fact would result in a concrete
injury that could form the basis for standing under Lujan. In particu-
lar, the court did not indicate that it considered the potential contri-
bution to global warming by carbon dioxide emissions from the
Mexican power plants as a basis for plaintiffs standing, even though it
accepted plaintiffs evidence that carbon dioxide emissions "are the
greatest by weight of all pollutants emitted by natural gas turbines" of
the sort proposed for use in those facilities. 54
After glossing over the standing question, the court next consid-
ered whether the alleged connection between the federal action and
climate change warranted review under NEPA. 55 To reach this issue,
the court first had to determine whether emissions from the proposed
Mexican power plants were properly within the scope of environmen-
tal review,56 because NEPA only applies to projects that are "subject to
[federal] control and responsibility."57 Because the proposed power
plants were outside the jurisdiction of the United States, the court
51. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted);
see also Pac. N.W. Generating Coop. v. Brown, 25 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding
that plaintiffs with an economic interest in preserving salmon have a procedural interest in
ensuring that the Endangered Species Act is followed); Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Navy,
841 F.2d 927, 933 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that residents who live near site of proposed
port have procedural standing to sue for Navy's alleged failure to follow permitting regula-
tions); City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that city lo-
cated near proposed freeway interchange has procedural standing to challenge agency's
failure to prepare an EIS).
52. See Border Power 1, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1010-11.
53. Id. at 1010.
54. Id. at 1029.
55. See id. at 1012.
56. Id.
57. 10 C.F.R. § 1021.104(b) (2007).
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concluded that they were properly excluded from the scope of the
proposed federal action for NEPA purposes.58 The court went on to
conclude, however, that emissions from the plants could be consid-
ered as indirect or "cumulative impacts" of the proposed federal ac-
tion and therefore should have been addressed in the EAs for the
project.59
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily on two pre-
vious Ninth Circuit decisions: Sylvester v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,60
and Wetlands Action Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.6' In Sylvester,
the court held that federal agencies are required to consider the indi-
rect or cumulative impacts of a project that is not within the defined
scope of a "proposed federal action," if that project and another pro-
ject that is within federal jurisdiction constitute "two links of a single
chain."62 The court stated that it is not enough if one project might
"benefit from the other's presence."63 The link between the two
projects must be such that each action could not exist without the
other. 64 In Wetlands Action Network, the court held that agencies are
only required to consider impacts associated with a non-federal action
if the causal linkage between the two is such that the non-federal ac-
tion cannot proceed without the related federal action. 65
The district court in Border Power I, relying on Sylvester and Wet-
lands Action Network, concluded that because one of the proposed
Mexican power plants was planned to be constructed solely for pur-
poses of supplying the United States energy grid over the proposed
transmission line, the two projects were sufficiently linked to require
consideration of the plant's emissions under NEPA. 66  ,
The court's discussion in Border Power I of the potential environ-
mental impacts of power-plant emissions of carbon dioxide on climate
58. See Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. at 1013.
59. See id. at 1033.
60. 884 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1989). The Sylvester case did not specifically address
whether impacts from projects outside the jurisdiction of the United States should be con-
sidered in connection with a related project within the United States; rather, it addressed
whether impacts from an entirely private project (a resort complex), which did not need
federal approval for other reasons, had to be considered in connection with a related pro-
ject (a golf course) for which federal approval was required. Id. at 400. This factual distinc-
tion was not relevant, however, to the court's analysis of indirect and cumulative impacts in
Border Power L
61. 222 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000).
62. Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 400.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1118.
66. See Border Power I, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1017 (S.D. Cal. 2003).
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change was cursory, at best. The court simply noted: the "record
shows that carbon dioxide is one of the pollutants emitted by a natural
gas turbine and that it is a greenhouse gas," emissions from the tur-
bines to be used at the proposed power plants in Mexico "have poten-
tial environmental impacts," and the government's "failure to disclose
and analyze" the significance of carbon dioxide emissions is "counter
to NEPA. ''67 The DOE subsequently issued an EIS that included an
evaluation of emissions from the proposed Mexican power facilities as
part of its analysis of project alternatives, but initial claims attacking
the document's cumulative impacts analysis were subsequently
dropped. 68
In its final decision, the court did not address the adequacy of the
EIS's analysis of potential climate change impacts. 69 Given this out-
come, Border Power I and Border Power Plant Working Group v. DOE (Bor-
der Power 1)70 are not particularly helpful as a guide to understanding
how environmental impacts associated with climate change should be
addressed under NEPA. However, the cases do suggest that an EA
alone is unlikely to provide a sufficient level of environmental analysis,
and that full consideration of the issue may require an EIS.
The significance of the Border Power decisions is that they are the
first instances of a court confirming that climate change is a legitimate
environmental issue that must be addressed by a government agency,
at least at some level, when conducting the environmental assessment
required by NEPA. Following the Border Power decisions, a federal
agency preparing an EA or EIS pursuant to NEPA will be cognizant
that failure to include a discussion of the impact of the proposed pro-
ject on climate change may subject the agency to litigation. A discus-
sion of impacts, however, is not synonymous with mitigation of
impacts. As explicated in greater detail below, requiring the NEPA
review process to include an assessment of the potential impact of a
project on climate change does not mean that the agency proposing
the project must actually reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from
that project. Thus, cases such as Border Power I and II, while symboli-
67. Id. at 1028-29.
68. See Border Power Plant Working Group v. Dep't of Energy (Border Power I1), 467 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1046 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
69. See id. Plaintiffs challenged the EIS under NEPA, alleging that the EIS inade-
quately considered project alternatives and mitigation measures and an alleged failure to
ensure the scientific accuracy of relied upon information. Id. at 1044-45. The court, how-
ever, rejected these challenges in all respects. Id. at 1045.
70. 467 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
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cally significant, illustrate that NEPA is an ineffective tool to address
the impacts of federal agency actions on global warming.
B. Mayo Foundation v. Surface Transportation Board
Mayo Foundation v. Surface Transportation Board7 more directly ad-
dresses the extent to which the agency proposing a major federal ac-
tion that may affect climate change must include an analysis of the
project's impact on climate change in its NEPA review.72 Mayo Founda-
tion involved a 2002 Surface Transportation Board ("Board") decision
approving construction of a 280-mile rail line from South Dakota to
the Wyoming Powder River Basin ("PRB") .73 The purpose of the pro-
ject was to provide an additional means to transport low-sulfur coal
from the PRB to coal-fired power-generation plants in the Midwest.
7 4
When the Board approved the project in 2002, a number of environ-
mental groups brought suit challenging that decision on grounds that
the EIS failed to fully analyze the likely environmental impacts of the
project.75 In 2003 in Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transpor-
tation Board,76 the Eighth Circuit agreed and remanded the matter
back to the Board for further environmental review. 77 Specifically, the
court directed the Board to examine the likelihood that the existence
of the rail project would result in lower rates for the transportation of
coal into Midwest markets, causing potential increases in the use of
coal for power generation purposes and commensurate increases in
the emission of carbon dioxide from coal-fired power facilities.
78
On remand, the Board directed the preparation of a supplemen-
tal EIS ("SEIS") to address the issues identified by the court.7 9 As to
the potential air impacts from increased coal usage, the SEIS included
a quantitative sensitivity analysis on the effect of lower transportation
rates on regional and national coal usage and found that "little addi-
tional coal would be consumed" due to the project.8 0 The analysis also
found that any change in PRB coal usage would translate to "minimal
71. 472 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2006).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 548.
74. See zd.
75. See id. at 549.
76. 345 F.3d 520 (8th Cir. 2003).
77. See id. at 534.
78. See id. at 550.
79. See Mayo Found., 472 F.3d at 549.
80. Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern R.R. Corp. Constr. Powder River Basin, Fin. Docket
No. 33407, 2006 VArL 383507, at *9 (Surface Transp. Bd. Feb. 13, 2007).
Summer 2007] GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
changes in air emissions from the electric power sector, both nation-
ally and regionally."'8 1 The Board was cursory and dismissive in ad-
dressing the comments it received on the potential impact of
increased emissions on global warming stating, "the scope of the air
emissions analysis in the... SEIS was sufficiently broad, and there was
no need for a full evaluation of global warming . . . as some of the
commentators suggested. '82 Moreover, according to the Board, "the
modest project-related increases in overall coal usage . . . imply that
any impacts of this project on global warming ... would necessarily be
modest as well."'8 3 Based on the analysis of potential increased emis-
sions provided in the SEIS, the Board issued a second decision ap-
proving the proposed PRB rail project. This second approval
prompted another petition for review by the court of appeals.8 4
The Eighth Circuit's 2006 review of the Board's reauthorization
of the PRB project affirmed the Board's decision in all respects, not-
ing that the Board's decision and underlying environmental review
documents "extensively discuss[ed] the potential impacts on air qual-
ity that may have resulted from implementation of the project. '8 5 The
court further concluded that "the Board more than adequately con-
sidered the 'reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects [of in-
creased coal consumption] on the human environment' on
remand."8 6 It did not address, however, petitioners' specific argu-
ments on the absence of any independent analysis of climate change
impacts, apparently accepting the Board's position that those impacts
could not have been significant enough to require any such analysis
for purposes of a NEPA review.
The Mayo Foundation decision validates the notion that even gen-
eralized climate change impacts can, and should, be addressed pursu-
81. Id. According to the SEIR, "projected air emissions for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, carbon dioxide and mercury associated with the small increase of additional coal
usage would be less than 1% .... Id.
82. Id. at *12.
83. Id.
84. See Reply Brief for Petitioners Sierra Club and Mid-State Coalition for Progress at
4, Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545 (8th Cir. 2006) (Nos. 06-2031, 06-
2032, 06-2047, 06-2048), 2006 WL 2788083, at *3-*4. Petitioners pointed out that "no-
where does the FSEIS address how burning millions of tons of additional coal might con-
tribute to global warming." Id. Moreover, Petitioners complained that under the Board's
analysis, "no future EIS would ever have to address the global warming implications of
federal actions, since under federal law no federal agency has regulatory jurisdiction over
carbon dioxide [as] an air pollutant." Id. Of course, Petitioners at the time were writing
without the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in the Massachusetts v. EPA case.
85. Mayo Found., 472 F.3d at 556.
86. Id.
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ant to the environmental analysis required under NEPA. Mayo
Foundation set the stage for courts to conclude, in other circum-
stances, that climate change impacts are a necessary component of
NEPA review. However, as the case illustrates, requiring a federal
agency to revise its assessment of potential impacts to include a more
detailed analysis of air impacts does not result in mitigation of those
impacts. Challengers in Mayo Foundation thus forced a recognition,
and not a reduction, of the potential impact of the project on global
warming. Mayo Foundation, like Border Power I and II, further illustrates
the ineffectiveness of litigation under NEPA as a tool with which to
combat climate change.
C. Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher
The most recent case to address the application of NEPA to
global climate change is Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher.8 7 In two sepa-
rate decisions, Friends of the Earth v. Watson (Mosbacher 1)88 and Friends
of the Earth v. Mosbacher (Mosbacher I1),89 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California addressed both of the
central issues constraining the capacity of the courts to address cli-
mate change under NEPA: standing and sufficiency of the relation-
ship between climate change and the proposed federal action.90 On
each issue, the district court stretched applicable law beyond anything
Congress could have intended when it enacted NEPA in 1969. If al-
lowed to stand on appeal, these decisions may subject a multitude of
international projects that potentially affect climate change to strin-
gent administrative review requirements under United States environ-
mental laws. Moreover, these review requirements are enforceable
through private party action in United States federal courts, even
where United States interests are severely limited. In suggesting the
possibility of mandatory environmental review for international
projects, Mosbacher could undermine independent policy decisions to
87. 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
88. No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. 2005). Mosbacher I addressed
defendants Overseas Private Investment Corporation ("OPIC") and Export-Import Bank's
("Ex-Im") motion for summary judgment. Id. at *1.
89. Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889. Mosbacher II addressed plaintiffs' and defend-
ants' motions for summary judgment. Id. at 891. The named defendant in Mosbacher II,
Robert Mosbacher, Jr., replaced Peter Watson, named defendant in Mosbacher I, as Presi-
dent and Chief Executive Officer of OPIC. See zd.
90. Mosbacher I focused almost exclusively on the standing issue. Mosbacher I, 2005 WL
2035596, at *3. Mosbacher II addressed more systematically the nature of the projects pur-
portedly requiring environmental review and the role federal agencies played in support-
ing those projects. Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889.
Summer 2007] GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW
promote economic development in parts of the world where United
States institutional support is most needed. 91
1. Background
Plaintiffs, a group of cities and an environmental group,92
brought an action against two quasi-governmental agencies to compel
them to conduct EAs under NEPA to address the global warming im-
pacts of projects supported by the agencies outside the United
States. 93 Plaintiffs claimed that the impacts of global warming on the
United States environment required the agencies to address global
warming pursuant to NEPA, even though none of the projects sup-
ported by the agencies are located in the United States. 94 By making
such an assertion, plaintiffs sought to extend NEPA's environmental
review requirements to greenhouse gas-emitting projects, primarily
but not exclusively energy related, located throughout the world, even
where only very modest United States governmental interests are
implicated.
Defendants, the Oversees Private Investment Corporation
("OPIC") and the Export-Import Bank of the United States ("Ex-Im"),
are both independent government corporations. 95 OPIC's mission is
to "mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States private
capital and skills in the economic and social development of less de-
veloped countries and areas, and countries in transition from
nonmarket to market economies .... -96 OPIC employs three basic
tools to accomplish its mission: (1) political risk insurance covering
currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence; (2) fi-
nancing through loan guarantees that provide medium- to long-term
funding to ventures involving significant equity or management par-
ticipation by United States businesses; and (3) direct loans to transac-
91. At a status conference on April 27, 2007, the district court indicated that it in-
tended to certify both of its decisions for interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See Civil Minute Order, Mosbacher I, No. C 02-4106JSW, 2005
WL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. 2005). The federal defendants have requested that the court defer
certification until they can obtain necessary administrative approvals to pursue such an
appeal. See Fifth Joint Case Management Statement and Proposed Case Management Or-
der, Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
92. See Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 891 n.1. The named plaintiffs were Friends of
the Earth, Inc.; Greenpeace, Inc.; the city of Boulder, Colorado; and the cities of Arcata,
Oakland, and Santa Monica, California. Id.
93. See id. at 892.
94. See id. at 897-901.
95. See id. at 893, 895.
96. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (2000).
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tions involving small United States businesses.97 OPIC has no role in
the development or approval of the projects for which an applicant
might seek insurance or loan guarantees to cover the applicant's risk
of project participation.9" Notably, OPIC is prohibited from providing
direct loans "to finance any operation for the extraction of oil or
gas."99
Ex-Im's mission complements that of OPIC. While OPIC provides
financial support for exports from the United States, °00 Ex-Im pro-
vides export credit insurance and guarantees to commercial banks
and other financial institutions in connection with exports of United
States capital goods and services, insurance products for short- and
medium-term credits, direct loans, and guarantees for working capital
loans made by commercial banks to United States exporters.10' Both
OPIC and Ex-Im have adopted guidelines requiring assessments of the
environmental impacts of certain approved projects. 0 20PIC's guide-
lines were adopted pursuant to section 117 of the Foreign Assistance
Act. 0 3 Under those guidelines, OPIC is required to conduct an "Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment," an "Initial Environmental Audit," or
97. See id. § 2194.
98. See Defendant OPIC's Cross Motion for SummaryJudgment at 3, Mosbacher II, 488
F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 02-4106).
99. See 22 U.S.C. § 2194(c).
100. See 12 U.S.C. § 635 (2000).
101. See MosbacherI, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 895 (N.D. Cal. 2007). One illustration of the
role OPIC and Ex-Im play in supporting projects outside the United States, cited repeat-
edly by the parties and the district court, involved an oil pipeline in Chad and Cameroon
(the "Chad-Cameroon Project") for which both agencies provided indirect financial assis-
tance. Id. at 896. The Chad-Cameroon Project was part of a larger development project
involving oil fields in Chad and oil-loading facilities off the Cameroon coast. Id. According
to defendants, the cost of the Chad-Cameroon Project is estimated at $2.2 billion and the
cost of the larger development project is estimated at $3.5 billion. Id. at 897. OPIC pro-
vided up to $250 million in political risk insurance coverage to a subcontractor in the
Chad-Cameroon Project that provided oil field drilling and related services; however, the
contract between OPIC and the subcontractor provided for a maximum payout of only
$100 million, and the subcontractor was required to pay over $1 million a year to OPIC to
maintain the insurance. Id. Additionally, the contract required the subcontractor to oper-
ate in compliance with World Bank pollution prevention and abatement guidelines and to
notify OPIC immediately of any accident occurring during the performance of its services
that "could reasonably be foreseen to have a material adverse impact on the environment."
Id. at 898-99. Ex-Im separately provided a $200 million loan guarantee to a bank partici-
pating in the financing of the larger development project, but did not provide any direct
financing for the project, or the component pipeline project. Id. at 898. The loan guaran-
tee by Ex-Im was intended to cover only "political risks (primarily war and civil unrest,
expropriation and transfer risks)" during the construction of the Chad-Cameroon Project
and after the project was completed and operating. Id.
102. See id. at 893, 895-96.
103. 22 U.S.C. § 2151p.
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both, for projects that are "likely to have significant adverse environ-
mental impacts that are sensitive (e.g. irreversible, affect sensitive eco-
systems, involve involuntary resettlement, etc.), diverse, or
unprecedented." 10 4 Crude oil refineries, large thermal power projects,
major oil-and-gas developments, and oil-and-gas pipelines are among
the general types of projects that would qualify for this type of envi-
ronmental analysis. 10 5 Projects not falling into these categories are
subject to a less extensive environmental review.10 6 Ex-Im's environ-
mental review guidelines specifically require "adherence to [NEPA's]
environmental review procedures" for long-term project financing,
loans, and guarantees. 10 7 An environmental review is not mandatory
for medium-term transactions, credit and working capital guarantees,
and short-term insurance products. 10 8 Both OPIC and Ex-Im under-
took analyses of the proposed projects challenged by plaintiffs under
their respective environmental review guidelines.'0 9
2. Standing in the Context of Global Climate Change
In Mosbacher I, OPIC and Ex-Im disputed plaintiffs' standing to
challenge agency actions supporting a variety of unrelated, foreign en-
ergy-development projects. 10 In addition to the Chad-Cameroon Pro-
ject," the actions challenged by plaintiffs included: (1) loan
guarantees to three mutual funds loaning money to an oil- and gas-
development project in eastern Russia; (2) a loan guarantee to United
States capital market investors loaning money to a trust funding an oil-
and gas-development project in Indonesia; (3) guarantees for United
States companies exporting services and equipment to support a pro-
ject to enhance an existing offshore petroleum complex in Mexico;
(4) guarantees for similar goods and services to develop oil fields and
a small refinery in Venezuela; and (5) guarantees to a United States
bank providing financing for the expansion of a coal-fired power
plant in China." 2 The agencies claimed that, with respect to any of
104. Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 896.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 896-97.
110. See Mosbacher I, No. C 02-4106 JSW, 2005 WL 2035596, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
111. See Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 897-98.
112. See Mosbacher I, 2005 WL 2035596, at *1.
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these projects, plaintiffs could not meet the three criteria for standing
required under Lujan: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.11 3
On August 23, 2005, the district court denied defendants' sum-
mary judgment motion, rejecting their argument that plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring an action against OPIC and Ex-Im. 114 Remarkably,
the district court found that plaintiffs met all three criteria for stand-
ing under Lujan.1 5 On the critical issue of injury in fact, the court
found that because plaintiffs' NEPA challenge raised only "procedural
issues," there was no requirement to show that a substantive environ-
mental harm was imminent or that the agencies' support of foreign
development projects would have "particular environmental ef-
fects." 16 Instead, all plaintiffs had to show was that it was "reasonably
probable that the challenged action will threaten their concrete inter-
ests."' 1 7 In that context, the court determined that plaintiffs had done
enough to establish injury in fact as a basis for standing." 8 In support
of its determination, the court noted that while "they concede that the
impact of greenhouse gas emissions traceable to projects supported by
OPIC and Ex-Im are not yet known with absolute certainty, Plaintiffs
contend the only uncertainty is with respect to how great the conse-
quences will be, and not whether there will be any significant
consequences."' 19
The court listed a number of contentions, drawn from a series of
one-sided declarations, on how much carbon dioxide would be emit-
ted by the challenged projects, how greenhouse gases are the major
contributor to global warming in the twentieth century, and how fur-
ther increases in greenhouse gas emissions will continue to increase
113. See zd. at *2 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).
114. See id. at *8.
115. See id. at *2-4.
116. Id. at *2 (citing Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 674 n.4 (9th Cir.
2001)); see Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir.
2003) (requiring plaintiffs to prove that the challenged federal project will have particular
environmental effects "would in essence be requiring that the plaintiff conduct the same
environmental investigation that he [sic] seeks in his suit to compel the agency to under-
take"). The irony, of course, is plaintiffs did not need to conduct any new environmental
analyses to establish standing, since for each of the projects challenged by plaintiffs, OPIC
and Ex-Im had already performed relevant environmental analyses. Had the court taken
those analyses into account in its assessment of the issue, it would have made the court's
determination that standing existed much more problematic.
117. Id. at *2 (citing Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 969-70); see also City of
Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004).
118. Mosbacher 1, 2005 WL 2035596, at *3.
119. Id.
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global warming with widespread environmental impacts.1 20 The court
further asserted, "these impacts have and will effect [sic] areas used
and owned by Plaintiffs."' 21 On that basis, the court concluded that
"Plaintiffs' evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that it is reasonably
probable that emissions from the projects supported by OPIC and Ex-
Im supported projects will threaten Plaintiffs' concrete interests.' 1 2 2
The court failed to explain, however, what specific "concrete inter-
ests" are in fact being threatened. The plaintiffs may have a genera-
lized interest in maintaining the stability of the global climate.
However, it is entirely unclear that such an interest is sufficiently dis-
tinct from the interests of any other member of the public to confer
standing to challenge agency actions in federal court.
The district court's approach to standing in Mosbacher I directly
conflicts with the Supreme Court's analysis in Lujan and with other
controlling precedent in the Ninth Circuit.' 23 The district court's ap-
proach is instead similar to Justice Blackmun's dissent in Lujan. In his
dissent, Justice Blackmun suggests that a procedural injury per se-
essentially, a grievance by an environmental plaintiff premised solely
on the failure of a government agency to follow pertinent administra-
tive procedures-is sufficient to establish the injury in fact required to
confer standing. 124 The majority opinion in Lujan, written by Justice
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992). Among other things,
the district court ignored the principal articulated in Lugan and followed by the Ninth
Circuit that suggests a close geographical or economic nexus between a proposed project
and alleged injury, while not necessarily determinative, is important when the character of
the injury is a procedural one. See id. at 560-61. None of the projects considered by the
district court in Mosbacher have anything near the close geographic and/or economic con-
nection with plaintiffs' interests identified in these cases.
124. According to Justice Blackmun, "as a general matter, the courts owe substantial
deference to Congress' substantive purpose in imposing a certain procedural require-
ment," and "[t] here is no room for a per se rule or presumption excluding injuries labeled
'procedural' in nature" as grounds to confer standing to plaintiffs in environmental cases."
Id. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stopped short, however, of sug-
gesting that procedural injuries without some connection to a substantive harm, albeit an
implicit one, are sufficient in this context. Id. ("There may be factual circumstances in
which a congressionally imposed procedural requirement is so insubstantially connected to
the prevention of a substantive harm that it cannot be said to work any conceivable injury
to an individual litigant."). Justice Blackmun somewhat dramatically concluded his dissent
in the Lujan case by stating "I cannot join the Court on what amounts to a slash-and-burn
expedition through the law of environmental standing. In my view, 'the very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury."' Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803)).
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Scalia, expressly rejected this approach, stating, "[w] e do not hold that
an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so
long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some
threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his
standing." 2 5
More importantly, the Lujan Court was very direct in stating that,
[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about gov-
ernment-claiming only harm to his and every citizen's interest in
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief
that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the
public at large-does not state an Article III case or controversy. 126
Therefore, the plaintiff lacks standing to challenge the govern-
ment's actions in federal court. 12 7 The district court in Mosbacher I
provided no explanation as to how plaintiffs in that case had been
harmed by the global warming impacts of the projects at issue in any
way that was distinct from harms arguably caused to United States citi-
zens generally. Nor did the court explain why the relief plaintiffs
sought provided any greater benefits to them than it would to any
other member of the public. In the absence of such explanation, it is
hard to see how the Mosbacher I plaintiffs could possibly establish suffi-
cient injury in fact to meet the standards set by the Supreme Court in
Lujan.
It is important to note that the Court's recent decision in Massa-
chusetts v. EPA does not in any way lower the requirement of Lujan
that litigants demonstrate injury in fact in environmental cases. 128 Of
the twelve states, four local government entities, and variety of envi-
ronmental and public interest groups which joined the litigation as
plaintiffs, only the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was found to have
standing to seek redress for its alleged climate change-related injuries
under CAA. 129 The Court based its decision on two grounds: first, the
fact that Massachusetts was a sovereign state and not a private litigant,
as was the case in Lujan and is also the case in Mosbacher,'3 and sec-
125. 504 U.S. at 573 n.8.
126. Id. at 573-74.
127. See zd. at 577-78.
128. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1452-57 (2007).
129. See id. at 1441.
130. See id. Massachusetts' status as a sovereign state is critical to the Court's ultimate
finding of standing. According to Justice Stevens, "[w]e stress here.., the special position
and interest of Massachusetts. It is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review
here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan, a private individual." Id. at 1454. The
Court cited Justice Holmes's decision in the seminal case of Georgta v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) ("This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-
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ond, the fact that only Massachusetts had demonstrated a sufficiently
particularized injury to meet the injury in fact requirement articulated
in Lujan.13 1 Justice Stevens, who wrote for the majority, was persuaded
to grant Massachusetts standing based in part on the State's argument
that it was jeopardized imminently by rising sea levels, which "have
already begun to swallow Massachusetts' coastal land."' 3 2 Moreover,
those changes had, and would continue to have, a direct and particu-
larized impact on Massachusetts, which owns a substantial portion of
the State's coastal property and operates or maintains a wide variety of
coastal-related public resources and infrastructure.13 3
Plaintiffs in Mosbacher I, by contrast, alleged only diffuse and gen-
eralized environmental impacts that could apply to anyone in the
United States. In support of their cross-motion for summary judg-
ment, plaintiffs rely on a series of supporting declarations asserting
that their organizational members "own" or "use and enjoy areas that
are, or will, be affected by climate change" and that "[e]ach of the
member Plaintiffs expresses a belief that the Defendants' action increase
(sic) the risk that their concrete interests will be harmed."'1 34 Declara-
tions submitted by several of the municipal plaintiffs assert that "criti-
cal infrastructure components are, or will be affected by climate
change, limiting their ability to provide municipal services, such as
water and sewer service, and requiring up-grades to existing infra-
structure. '' 35 Yet nowhere do plaintiffs explain with any particularity
what the alleged effects specifically might be. As the federal defend-
ants pointed out, none of the declarations relied upon by plaintiffs
showed specific facts to support their contention that they would be
"'directly' affected apart from their 'special interest in the subject"' of
sovereign. In that capacity, the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain." (emphasis added)). The Court
also observed that "U]ust as Georgia's 'independent interest ... in all the earth and air
within its domain' supported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts'
well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today." Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S.
Ct. at 1454.
131. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1441.
132. Id. at 1442.
133. See id. at 1456 n.19.
134. Plaintiffs' Cross-motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for SummaryJudgment at 13, Mosbacher, 2005 WAIL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No.
02-4106). According to plaintiffs, even the professional interests of their members will be
harmed by climate change. Id. ("Climate change is currently harming and will continue to
harm me because its effects contribute to diminished opportunities for fundamental bio-
logical research and my ability to pursue my profession."). How that specifically might
happen is left entirely unclear.
135. Id. at 14.
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the agency actions at issue. 136 This failure, in conjunction with their
status strictly as private parties and local governmental entities, sug-
gests compellingly that the plaintiffs in Mosbacher do not have standing
and should not have been allowed to prosecute their NEPA claims
against OPIC and Ex-Im, even after the Court's decision in Massachu-
setts v. EPA. 13 7
3. Major Federal Actions Affecting Global Warming
In its March 30, 2007 decision, Mosbacher I,138 the district court
held that NEPA requires OPIC and Ex-Im to address the impacts of
greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fuel projects the agencies sup-
port in developing countries where such projects constitute "major
federal actions" for NEPA purposes. 139 Between 1990 and 2001, Ex-Im
allegedly provided over $25 billion in loans and financial guarantees
to 474 fossil-fuel projects.1 40 Between 1990 and 2006, OPIC allegedly
136. Defendants' Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment at 8, Mosbacher, 2005 V4rL 2035596 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (No. 02-4106) (citing Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992)).
137. In addition to injury in fact, the district court found that the requirements to show
causation and redressability under Lujan also were met in Mosbacher I. Mosbacher 1, 2005 WL
2035596, at *2-3. On the causation issue, the court essentially relied on nothing more than
a few self-serving public relations statements to suggest a causal link between the foreign
energy projects at issue and the ancillary actions of OPIC and Ex-Im to support those
projects. Id. at *4 ("For example, Ex-Im has stated that it 'supports export sales that other-
wise would not have gone forward.' And OPIC has stated that when it determines which
projects to support, it evaluates them 'to ensure they would not have gone forward but for
OPIC's participation."' (record citations omitted)). As discussed above, however, OPIC
and Ex-Im rarely, if ever, provide direct financial support to foreign development projects,
and the indirect support the agencies do provide is seldom crucial to the viability of a
project. It is difficult to imagine that the types of projects supported by OPIC and Ex-Im
would not go forward (and the associated environmental impacts not occur) simply due to
the absence of support from those agencies; indeed, the court acknowledged evidence
submitted by the agencies that "generally, for the large energy-related projects referenced
in Plaintiffs' complaint, third parties have already completed basic design and planning
stages for the projects before applying for financial support from Ex-Im or OPIC." Id. On
the issue of redressability, the court simply found that because "OPIC and EX-Im's deci-
sions could be influenced by further environmental studies, Plaintiffs' [sic] have sufficiently
demonstrated redressability." Id. at *4 (emphasis added). In that context, the district court
simply ignored the Supreme Court's guidance in Lujan, where it held that plaintiffs face a
particular burden in establishing redressability for the impacts of a foreign project where
United States agencies "supply only a fraction of the funding for [the] foreign project."
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 (1992).
138. 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
139. Id. at 909-10.
140. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d
889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 024106), 2005 WL 3971170 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, Export-Import Bank, Energy Financing Trends Affected by Various Factors 5
(2002)).
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provided financial support to sixty-four fossil-fuel projects that will
contribute nearly eighty tons of carbon dioxide emissions annually.
41
Plaintiffs maintained that greenhouse gases from projects supported
by OPIC and Ex-Im constituted roughly eight percent of 2003 global
emissions, 142 although they conceded that they cannot quantify the
precise impacts of such emissions on the domestic environment. 143
The district court found that while both OPIC and Ex-Im are sub-
ject to NEPA, the record contained insufficient evidence to determine
whether the projects cited by plaintiffs are major federal actions and
thus subject to NEPA review. 144 The court rejected plaintiffs' conten-
tion that defendants operated energy "programs" that may require
preparation of a programmatic EIR under NEPA, noting that the vari-
ous energy projects supported by defendants were not "a group of
concerted actions to implement a specific policy or plan." 145 The Mos-
bacher I court specifically declined to accept the contention that fossil-
fuel-based energy projects supported by defendants were components
of a larger action intentionally divided by defendants into multiple
actions, and held that the projects lacked the geographical or tempo-
ral nexus required to make proposed actions "cumulative actions"
subject to a single EIS.146
The court next considered whether individual projects could be
considered major federal actions in and of themselves, focusing in
particular on the amount and nature of funding provided for the
projects by OPIC and Ex-Im. The court concluded that it was unable
to determine, based on the record, whether the amount of financing
provided by defendants was sufficient to render the projects major
federal actions, although it also found that the viability of the projects
absent defendants' support indicated that defendants lacked the con-
trol and responsibility necessary for the court to conclude that the
projects were major federal actions. 147 The court thus held that plain-
tiffs failed to demonstrate that the projects were major federal actions
and that defendants failed to show that the projects were not major
141. See id. at 12.
142. See Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
143. See Mosbacher 1, 2005 WL 2035596, at *3.
144. See Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 912-19.
145. Id. at 909 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(b)(3) (2006)).
146. Id. at 919.
147. See zd. at 918-19.
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federal actions. 148 What this means as a procedural matter in a case
brought under APA is unclear. The decision suggests that the determi-
nation of whether a project is a major federal action can be a matter
for which evidence outside the administrative record must be consid-
ered by a trier of fact other than the governmental agency that consid-
ered the action in the first place.
The court's decision effectively to defer consideration of the "ma-
jor federal action" issue in this case to future judicial proceedings is
difficult to understand given the clarity of Ninth Circuit precedent on
the issue. Under NEPA's implementing regulations, "major federal ac-
tion" is defined to include not only projects "approved" by a federal
agency, but also projects that are "entirely or partly financed, assisted,
conducted, regulated or approved" by the federal entity.1 49 In Ka
Makani '0 Kohala Ohana, Inc. v. Water Supply (Ka Makani),150 however,
the Ninth Circuit has made clear that a "federal funding contribution
alone" cannot transform an entire project into a major federal ac-
tion. 151 Where final decision-making authority remains at all times
with a non-federal entity, the provision of financial or other assistance
to that entity does not constitute "discretionary involvement or con-
trol over" a project sufficient to render it a "major federal action"
under NEPA.152 Later district court decisions following Ka Makani
have suggested that to transform a federally-funded project by a non-
federal entity into a "major federal action" for NEPA purposes, the
148. See id. at 919. While the court in Mosbacher H denied plaintiffs' motion for sum-
mary judgment, it granted in part and denied in part the government's cross-motions. Id.
at 891.
149. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (2006); see also U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541
U.S. 752, 763-64 (2004) ("Major federal action is defined to 'includ[e] actions with effects
that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility.'"
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18)).
150. 295 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2002).
151. Id. at 960. The Ka Makani case involved limited funding and advisory support by
two federal agencies-the U.S. Geological Service ("USGS") and the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development ("HUD")-in connection with an assessment of groundwater
availability to support a state agency's proposed water diversion project. Id. at 958. The two
agencies contributed approximately $1.3 million to support the proposed project, less than
two percent of the total estimated project cost of $80 million. Id. at 960.
152. Id. at 961; see also Sierra Club v. Babbit, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs
there challenged a BLM decision, based on an EA under NEPA, to allow construction of
access roads on federal forest lands, even though plaintiffs argued that the construction
could have an adverse affect on species protected under the Federal Endangered Species
Act ("ESA"). Id. at 1506-07. Because the project proponent had a preexisting right to
develop the roads (based on contracts that pre-dated NEPA), the court found that BLM
did not have the right to exercise control over the project to the degree needed to subject
it to NEPA's further procedural requirements. Id. at 1513.
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amount of federal financing must be "overwhelming" and the capacity
of the federal agency to exercise control and responsibility over the
project, through oversight in the use of federal dollars, if not direct
decision-making, must be clear.153
The requisite elements of discretionary involvement and control
identified in these cases are simply not present in Mosbacher. In the
Chad-Cameroon Project, for example, OPIC's financial involvement
was indirect and modest at best-approval of $250 million in political
risk insurance, not direct financing, to a United States subcontractor
on a foreign-development project worth billions. 54 The same was true
for Ex-Im's support-a $200 million loan guarantee, again for politi-
cal risk management, again no direct financing.' 55 In no case cited by
the court could OPIC's and Ex-Im's financial support be considered
"overwhelming." More significantly, in no case did OPIC or Ex-Im
have discretionary control over a decision to proceed with a project.
The court dedicated only a footnote to the key issue of whether
NEPA is the correct tool with which to address global warming. 156 De-
fendants claimed that the impacts of global warming on the domestic
environment ostensibly caused by the projects they support are too
remote and speculative for analysis under NEPA.157 The court did not
address the remote and speculative nature of plaintiffs' claims or the
wisdom of using NEPA to address global warming. Rather, the court
chose a superficial analysis: given that projects supported by OPIC and
Ex-Im emit greenhouse gases and greenhouse gases contribute to
global warming, are the agencies' actions a "but for" cause of the emis-
sions from such projects?' 58 The court failed to answer even this ques-
tion, stating that, since it could not determine whether the viability of
the projects depended upon defendants' support or whether defend-
153. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. ("USFWS"), 235 F. Supp. 2d 1109
(D. Or. 2002). In that case, USFWS was contributing seventy-five percent of the cost of a
State of Oregon study of local elk populations. Id. at 1121. The court found that the "over-
whelming percentage of federal dollars involved .. .is probably sufficient to 'federalize'
the project." Id. The court also found that the USFWS had the ability to control the project
through its oversight function. Id. ("Monitoring to ensure compliance demonstrates the
ability to control the manner in which the study is being conducted because if the study is
not being conducted in compliance with the plan as proposed, the implication is that the
[US]FWS will no longer fund it.").
154. See Mosbacher I, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 897 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
155. See id. at 898.
156. See id. at 918 n.19.
157. See id.
158. Id. (citing Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004), concluding
that, where an agency has limited authority over the relevant action to prevent a certain
effect, the agency "cannot be considered a legally relevant 'cause' of the effect").
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ants could exercise significant control over the projects they support,
it could not determine whether defendants are a "legally relevant
cause of the alleged effects on the domestic environment."'' 59
The court's holding implies that OPIC and Ex-Im may be re-
quired to conduct an environmental review pursuant to NEPA for
every application for assistance related to the power sector. The time
and cost involved in the preparation of an EA under NEPA guidelines
may discourage OPIC and Ex-Im from considering fossil-fuel projects
in developing countries, to the substantial detriment of the people in
those countries who would most directly benefit from the projects. In
addition, sponsors from countries where lesser or no comparable envi-
ronmental review is required may become more attractive than
United States agency sponsors, resulting in potentially less rigorous
scrutiny of the environmental impacts of fossil-fuel projects and corre-
spondingly less pressure to mitigate those impacts on the global
environment.
The most disturbing aspect of the Mosbacher decisions is the facile
application of what is essentially a domestic environmental-review pro-
gram, designed to apply to domestic projects with discernible domes-
tic impacts, to projects outside the United States with environmental
impacts that are amorphous and not distinctly linked to environmen-
tal conditions within the United States. Generally, incremental envi-
ronmental impacts in the United States are not "reasonably
foreseeable" impacts proximately caused by agency action. 60 Funda-
mentally, global warming is a cumulative impact that cannot be traced
to the impact of a particular project on the other side of the world.
Under NEPA, a project proponent typically evaluates cumulative im-
pacts by looking at a range of current and reasonably foreseeable fu-
ture projects; given the vast number and variety of actions in the
United States and abroad currently contributing to global climate
change, an evaluation of cumulative impacts is not realistically
possible.
In sum, the Mosbacher decisions are symbolic attempts to force
United States government agencies to address global warming. As
noted above, requiring such agencies to review climate change as an
environmental impact under NEPA will lead only to a recognition of
the issue, not a strategy to mitigate the issue. Perhaps more impor-
tantly, the piecemeal approach represented by cases such as Mosbacher,
159. Mosbacher II, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 918 n.19.
160. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2006).
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and evidenced by the use of litigation to combat global warming in
general, is opposite to the comprehensive, international response re-
quired to address global warming.
III. Conclusion
Clearly, climate change and its anthropogenic causes are no
longer a matter of serious scientific dispute. Just as clearly, existing
governmental and intergovernmental measures (such as the Kyoto
Protocol) have yet to show themselves to be efficacious in dealing with
the problem of climate change. Given the gap between the problem
as now recognized and the capacity of available policy tools to con-
front the problem, the impulse to fill that gap through judicial action
under statutes like NEPA is entirely understandable. Under the appro-
priate circumstances, there is little doubt, for example, that: (1) the
impact of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change is an issue
properly within the scope of NEPA's environmental-review require-
ments; (2) greenhouse-gas-emitting projects outside the jurisdictional
boundaries of the United States can be the subject of those require-
ments; and (3) private action by United States citizens can be a legiti-
mate vehicle for forcing extra-jurisdictional consideration of climate
change impacts.
Nevertheless, the courts should be careful to recognize that
NEPA-based environmental review and litigation strategies have inher-
ent limitations as weapons to be used in the war against global warm-
ing-both domestically and internationally. After over a quarter
century of judicial development, the rules governing standing and
project scope for environmental review purposes are well established.
As well articulated in Border Power I and II, Mayo Foundation, and Mos-
bacher I and II, the courts generally have framed those rules in the
context of relatively localized impacts from domestic projects with a
substantial federal connection within the United States. These rules
are clearly not intended to apply to highly-generalized impacts associ-
ated with a global phenomenon like climate change, caused by both
domestic and internationally-related activities diffusely spread across
the planet. In the case of agencies like OPIC and Ex-Im, a require-
ment to prepare detailed EAs under NEPA for proposed fossil-fuel or
other greenhouse-gas-related projects will not appreciably reduce
global warming. Such agencies have little capacity to influence either
the construction or day-to-day operation of the projects they support,
and mandating that they conduct a particularized environmental re-
view for a proposed international project will not necessarily reduce
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the amount of greenhouse-gas-emissions from that project in any ap-
preciable way.
Global warming may well be the most important environmental
challenge this country will ever face. However, established legislative
and regulatory strategies, developed to address different issues at a
different time in the nation's history, cannot be relied upon to meet
that challenge. The focus must shift from litigation to new and credi-
ble policy responses that will allow society to effectively manage the
consequences of the environmental changes that now seem inevitable
as a result of global warming. Initial steps, in California, elsewhere in
the United States, and internationally, have begun, but hard work
remains.
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